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This paper investigates whether there is any consistency between banks’ financial strength 
ratings (bank rating) and their risk-return profiles. It is expected that banks with high ratings 
tend to earn high expected returns for the risks they assume and thereby have a low 
probability of experiencing financial distress. Bank ratings, a measure of a bank’s intrinsic 
safety and soundness, should therefore be able to capture the bank’s ability to manage 
financial distress while achieving risk-return efficiency. We first estimate the expected 
returns, risks, and financial distress risk proxy (the inverse z-score), then apply the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to obtain the risk-return efficiency score for each bank, and 
finally conduct ordered logit regressions of bank ratings on estimated risks, risk-return 
efficiency, and the inverse z-score by controlling for other variables related to each bank’s 
operating environment. We find that banks with a higher efficiency score on average tend to 
obtain favorable ratings. It appears that rating agencies generally encourage banks to trade 
expected returns for reduced risks, suggesting that these ratings are generally consistent 
with banks’ risk-return profiles. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A bank financial strength rating (bank rating) is a summary measure of a bank’s intrinsic 
safety and soundness.
1
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether there is a consistency between banks’ 
financial strength rating (bank rating) and their risk-return profiles. Specifically, we are 
interested in examining whether rating agencies assign higher bank ratings to those banks 
with a higher risk-return efficiency score. In addition, we are also interested in assessing 
whether the rating agencies treat banks with the same efficiency score similarly  from a 
ratings consistency perspective. Such findings hope to reveal the importance the rating 
agencies attach to financial distress risk in their assessments of bank ratings.  
 These ratings provide an indication as to how likely a bank will run 
into financial difficulty and request assistance from its owners, industry group, or the 
authorities (Estrella et al 2000). Banks with strong intrinsic safety and soundness generally 
take on risk prudently. They usually earn high expected returns for the risks they assume and 
thereby have a low probability of experiencing financial distress and  a high probability of 
recovering from adverse exogenous circumstances (DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon 2001). It 
is expected that a bank rating that aims to capture bank intrinsic safety and soundness also 
reflects how well a bank manages its portfolios in order to achieve risk-return efficiency and 
avoid financial distress.  
Using a global banking database that consists of 1,049 banks from major economies of the 
world from 2000 to 2004 and building upon the latest development in estimating banks’ risk-
return efficiency and risk-adjusted production frontier, we find that banks with higher 
efficiency scores on average tend to obtain more favorable ratings and the rating agencies 
generally encourage banks to trade expected returns for reduced risks, indicating that bank 
ratings are generally consistent with risk-return profiles. But does Moody’s view risk appetites 
differently  from Fitch? Our empirical findings reveal that there indeed is a difference. It 
appears that the Fitch’s Bank Individual Rating (FBIR) pays extra attention to financial 
distress risk, whereas the Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Rating (MBFSR) does not.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a succinct review of related 
literature. Section 3 discusses the estimation framework in detail. Section 4 presents the key 
findings of the paper. Section 5 concludes.  
                                                 
1   Two rating agencies, Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s) and Fitch Ratings, Inc, have each published such 
ratings. In the case of the Moody’s, it is called Moody’s bank financial strengthen rating (MBFSR). In the case 
of the Fitch, it is called Fitch bank individual rating (FBIR). ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The concept of how to best measure bank efficiency has evolved over time. Leibenstein 
(1966) introduced the term of X-efficiency. However, the X-efficiency theory is not 
underpinned in a framework of profit-maximization or cost-minimization for firms. Instead, it 
recognizes that individuals in firms have incomplete contracts, selective rationality, and effort 
discretions (Button and Weyman-Jones 1994). As a result, most of the literature follows the 
Farrell (1957) efficiency concept, which is based on a cost or profit optimization assumption.
2
However, bank managers face a more complex optimization problem when selecting a loan 
portfolio. Because of risk and return trade offs, bank managers may have incentives to 
assume less risk in order to preserve the bank, and therefore, their jobs. In this case, bank 
managers may maximize their own utility (for example, job security) and trade high returns 
for low risk. Moreover, even though managers act in the interest of shareholders and 
maximize the value of shareholders’ wealth, their risk preferences are still relevant in 
determining bank performance. As stated in Koch and MacDonald (2006), the value of 
shareholders’ wealth is dependent on the underlying portfolio risk and return profile, which, in 
turn, is closely tied to management strategies pursued by managers and shaped by 
managers’ risk preference. In general, if bank managers maximize expected profits, they 
rank production plans only by the first moment of the expected profit distribution; if they 
maximize their utility or maximize the value of shareholders’ wealth, higher moments of the 
expected profit distribution will matter in the ranking (Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon 
1999). This suggests the necessity and importance of applying models with more generality 
to estimate bank efficiency.
  
3
Hughes and Moon (1995), based on Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon’s (1995) framework, 
proposed a new measure on bank risk-return efficiency using the utility maximization 
assumption and the almost ideal demand (AID) system specification to obtain measures of 
predicted return on equity and risk, the standard error of the prediction, which in turn allow 
them to estimate a stochastic risk-return frontier and efficiency score. Under this framework, 
 
                                                 
2   In the literature on bank X-efficiency, parametric and non-parametric techniques have been developed to 
estimate cost or profit frontier and to compute the relative efficiency of decision-making units. The parametric 
methodology comprises Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), Distribution-Free Analysis (DFA), and Thick 
Frontier Analysis (TFA), while the non-parametric methodology mainly includes Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and its special case—Free Disposal Hull (FDH) analysis (Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell, and Battese 2005). The 
two approaches primarily differ from each other in the assumptions imposed on the functional form of the 
efficient frontier, the existence of random error, and the probability distribution of the inefficiencies and random 
error (Bauer 1990; Berger and Humphrey 1997; Paradi, Vela, and Yang 2004).  
3  In fact, some studies (e.g., Hughes and Mester 1994a, 1994b), have attempted to empirically investigate the 
risk preference of bank managers. They tested whether managers are risk neutral and maximize expected 
profits or they are risk averse and trade off profit for risk reduction; they found that bank managers in the US 
are generally risk-averse. ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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a bank’s inefficiency at a certain level of risk is calculated as the difference in expected return 
between this bank and the best-practice banks on the efficient risk-return frontier. Because 
their framework links the structural model of production to an efficient risk-return frontier that 
is estimated using the predicted return and risk, the resulting measure of inefficiency does 
not assume non-neutrality toward risk and sub-optimal choices of quality-linked prices. 
Furthermore, this measurement may also be consistent with capital market pricing.
4
Using the same framework, DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon (2001) investigated the 
consistency between supervisory capital, asset, management, equity, and liability (CAMEL) 
ratings and risk-return efficiency by examining the degree to which the CAMEL ratings reflect 
bank risk-return efficiency. The authors conducted an ordered logit regression of each bank’s 
CAMEL rating in the United States in 1994 on the bank’s corresponding expected return on 
the frontier, risk, risk-return inefficiency, and asset size. They found that bank supervisors are 
influenced not only by banks’ risk-return choices, but also by how efficiently banks make this 
trade-off. This suggests that the CAMEL ratings are consistent with estimated risk-return 
efficiency. 
 
3.  BANK RATING AND RISK-RETURN PROFILE: 
EMPIRICAL ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Empirical Issues 
As shown in Figure 1, the risk-return frontier appears on the envelope RRF if no risk-free 
asset for banks is assumed. Not all banks, however, are able to operate their asset portfolios 
along the frontier. The bank at point A, for instance, is not taking risks efficiently, which could 
be due to management incapability or operating environment. The bank at point A has many 
options to improve its efficiency. For instance, it could increase its expected return to point E 
without changing risk profile. Meanwhile, the upper bound probability of financial distress 
also decreases as the z-score ray becomes steeper. If this bank is less conservative, it could 
move along the original z-score ray (i.e. DZ1) to point D. This scenario would increase both 
its expected return and risk, but the upper bound probability of financial distress would 
remain unchanged. If this bank is quite conservative, it may choose to reduce both risk and 
financial distress probability to point F while maintaining the same expected return. For the 
bank to be on the frontier, it has to trade expected returns for reduced risks (e.g., from point 
D to E) and has a lower upper bound probability of financial distress. 
                                                 
4   Hughes and Moon (1995) showed that, for a sub-sample of publicly traded banks, their measures of expected 
profit and return risk explain 96% of the variation in the market value of the banks’ equity, implying that their 
measure of inefficiency is also consistent with capital market pricing of banks. ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Sources: Blair and Heggestad (1978); DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon (2001).  
The risk-return profile in Figure 1 may also indicate the financial distress risk of a bank or the 
probability of a bank under financial distress. Financial distress generally means that a bank 
can not pay off,  or has difficulty in paying off, its financial obligations, which can be 
equivalent to economic insolvency (i.e., the loss exceeds the equity capital). Thus, the 
financial distress risk can be defined as the likelihood of the event that a bank’s loss exceeds 
its total capital. Let π   be the random return with mean  () E π   and the standard deviation π σ  . 
Given the portfolio characteristics and the bank’s capital position, Chebyshev’s inequality 
may indicate the approximate probability of financial distress (Blair and Heggestad 1978). 
Chebyshev’s inequality suggests  
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probability that a bank would be under financial distress, while along the ray, different risk-
return combinations have the same upper bound probability of financial distress (constant z-
scores).  
Banks with strong intrinsic safety and soundness should be able to manage risk efficiently, 
and therefore, they shall operate closely to or even on the risk-return frontier and avoid being 
exposed to costly financial distress. Bank ratings—MBFSR from Moody’s and FBIR from 
Fitch—attempt to, as they are defined, reflect bank intrinsic safety and soundness or 
measure the likelihood that a bank will require assistance from third parties such as its 
owners or official institutions. Thus, the ratings also indicate how well a bank manages its 
portfolios—in other words, whether the bank achieves risk-return efficiency and is away from 
financial distress. To investigate whether these ratings are consistent with the risk-return 
profiles, this study examines whether rating agencies assign higher ratings to those banks on 
the frontier compared to those below the frontier. In addition, we are interested in finding out 
whether rating agencies such as Moody’s and Fitch assign different ratings to those banks 
with the same efficiency score, taking financial distress risk into account.  
3.2  Empirical Methodology 
3.2.1  The AID System and the Most Preferred Demand Function System of Banks 
To examine the above-mentioned empirical issues, it is necessary to estimate risk-return 
efficiency and financial distress probability. Here, we follow the framework of Hughes, Lang, 
Mester, and Moon (1995, 1996, and 1999). In these studies, the AID System is applied to 
specify the minimum expenditure necessary to attain a specific utility level at given prices for 
the bank managerial team. The AID System proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) is 
built on the theorems of Muellbauer (1975, 1976) about a specific class of preferences for 
aggregating consumers’ demand and can be applied to obtain both theoretically consistent 
and empirically obtainable functional forms for the bank’s most preferred demand functions 
for inputs and profits. The budget shares are assumed to have “price-independent 
generalized form” (PIGL) and market demands can be considered as the outcome of 
decisions by a rational representative consumer. As a member of PIGL family, the AID 
System has many desirable properties
5, making it attractive in accommodating generalized 
managerial preferences. In this study, the AID expenditure function can be specified as 
follows:
6
(2)     
 
0 ln ( ) ln ( )( )
j i
ij ij E P U y w pk
ν β µκ
π β ⋅= + ⋅ Π Π , 
where  
                                                 
5   For instance, it gives a first-order approximation to any demand system while it still precisely satisfies the 
axioms of choice. Furthermore, its functional form is consistent with household-budget data while it also 
aggregates perfectly over consumers without invoking parallel linear Engel curves.  
6   The details of deriving this expenditure function can be found in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
6 
lnE   —  the expenditure of the bank management 
ln P   —  the price index 
U   —  the generalized managerial utility for the bank 
i y   —  the output i 
j w   —  the price of input j 
pπ   —  the price of after-tax profit (π ) in terms of before-tax 
profit, equivalent to 1/(1-t) where t is tax rate 
k   —  the equity capital 
,,, βνµκ  —  parameters to be estimated 
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Note that the average output price ( p  ) instead of price for each output is used. This would 
help conserve degrees of freedom and avoid data unavailability problems in the estimation. 
The risk-free rate of return is r .  
Most preferred input and profit share equations are obtained by applying Shephard’s lemma 
to the expenditure function. These procedures yield the share equations for inputs and 
profit:
7
                                                 
7   The symmetry condition is applied to coefficients of input prices: 
 
** ( )/2 si is si is ωω ωω = = +  and 
** ( )/2 s ss s ππ ππ ωω ωω = = + . ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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where  p  and  y  represent the vectors of output price and output, respectively, and m 
represents other income. 
In addition, it is also straightforward to include the first-order condition for equity capital in the 
system to account for its endogeneity. Since the conditional indirect utility function is the de 
facto Lagrangian function for the utility maximization problem, the first-order condition for 





. The given level of utility can be 
substituted for by the indirect utility function in the expenditure function after solving the 
expenditure minimization problem, the dual problem of utility maximization (see Appendix I). 
Thus, inverting equation (2) yields  

















Thus, the AID System’s first-order condition for equity capital is given as follows: 
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This yields equation (6): 
(6)   [ ] ln ln ln ln ln ln ln( ) ln 0 . kk pk jk j sk s k k
js
k p y w r p mP π ππ ρρ ψ γ ω τ η κ + + + + + + + ⋅+ − = ∑∑ py   
Parameters in the system of equations (3), (4), and (6) are restricted by symmetry, 
homogeneity, and adding-up  conditions, which are listed in Appendix B. This system 
provides a robust framework to analyze many issues in the banking business, such as bank 
risk-return efficiency, financial distress, bank scale economies, among others. The nonlinear 
seemingly unrelated regression equations (Nonlinear SURE) model is applied to estimate the 
nonlinear AID system above. To allow for risk preferences to change over time, estimation of 
the system is done for each year. Also, as emphasized by DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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(2001) and other studies, homoskedasticity on the error terms shall not be imposed so that 
the risk of the production plan can be measured. 
3.2.2  Measuring Risk-return Efficiency and Financial Distress Risk 
Before empirically estimating bank efficiency parameters, there are three important issues to 
be discussed: First, different measures of inputs and outputs may greatly affect efficiency 
scores and rankings, but unfortunately, there still seems to be no existing approach  that is 
widely accepted. To solve this problem, researchers mainly undertake two approaches—the 
“production” approach and the “intermediation” approach—to define banking business 
activities (Berger and Humphrey 1997).
8 The “production” approach views banking activities 
as the production of accounts and services (e.g., demand deposits, term and saving 
deposits, real estate loans, consumer loans, and business loans) to customers (both 
depositors and borrowers). This view is probably suitable for the case of local branches as 
these  services are usually provided face-to-face to customers in local branch offices or 
delivered at customers’ premises. Hence, inputs in this approach are labor and physical 
capital while outputs are the number of deposit accounts and loan services. The alternative 
“intermediation” approach essentially reflects the asset transformation function of banks, 
namely, intermediating funds between savers and investors. This approach is mostly 
appropriate for banks’  main branches or themselves  as they are responsible for the 
“transforming” activities instead of being directly in contact with customers. Inputs in this 
approach are primarily financial funds (deposits and other borrowed funds) while outputs are 
loans and outstanding investments. Neither approach, however, captures the whole picture 
of the modern banking activities. Furthermore, the controversy on whether deposits should 
count as inputs or outputs still remains.
9
The second important concern on measuring bank efficiency, especially for international 
comparison, is how to control for environmental factors. Environment (e.g., market structure, 
credit culture, financial regulations, and macroeconomic stability) is also an important 
determinant for bank performance. However, it is mostly out of banks’ control. When one 
does not account for differences in environment and simply construct a common frontier for 
all banks across countries, the estimated efficiency score could be artificially high (low) for 
banks under a  favorable (unfavorable) environment. To avoid this problem some studies 
restrict their study sample within a certain sub-region that has a similar economic 
environment. For instance, Berg, Forsund, Hjalmarsson, and Suominen (1993) evaluated 
  
                                                 
8   Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Paradi, Vela, and Yang (2004) each  categorized the literature into three 
approaches. Besides the above-mentioned two approaches, the former also included a “modern” approach that 
attempts to incorporate risk management and information processing into banking activities, while the latter 
added the “profitability” approach that is designed to examine the process of how well a branch uses its inputs 
(expenses) to produce revenues. 
9   This is probably due to the dual characteristics of deposits. Deposits are paid with interests and are the “raw 
material” of investible funds of banks. Also, banks compete for deposits as they are associated with liquidity, 
safekeeping, and payment services provided to depositors (Berger and Humphrey 1997). ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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bank efficiency only for Nordic countries. Some other studies (e.g., Lozano-Vivas, Pastor, 
and Hasan 2001) incorporate environmental factors in the basic data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) model by treating them as inputs or outputs. These solutions, however, are 
problematic and not satisfactory.
10 The recent endeavor by Pastor (2002) and Avkiran (2007) 
to tackle this problem is to apply a three-stage DEA.
11
Third, incorporating risk in efficiency measurement is another challenge for standard 
efficiency studies. Managing risk is an intrinsic function of financial institutions. Therefore, it 
is natural to include bank risks in the frontier analysis. The fact that risk can arise from 
various sources (e.g., loans, interest rate movements, liquidity shortage, and contingent 
liabilities) complicates the analysis. The present common approach is to use a risk proxy, 
such as nonperforming loans (NPL) or loan loss provisions, as an input or a negative output 
of banks. As argued by many studies, the quality of loans can not represent all types of risks 
that banks face, although it may be a good proxy for credit risk. Furthermore, it may be 
inadequate to simply add risk measures to the profit maximization and cost minimization 
problems. For instance, one may need to account for the risk preference of managers in 
measuring bank efficiency. Some studies (e.g., Mester 1996) attempt to address it by treating 
financial capital as an input in the production process. As financial capital provides a cushion 
against losses, lower capital may indicate higher probability of default. Thus, a risk-averse 
manager may operate the bank with a level of financial capital that is different from the cost-
minimizing one. In this sense, the level of financial capital may reflect risk preferences of 
bank managers, and therefore, counting financial capital as an input may control for risk 
preferences in measuring bank efficiency. While this is an insightful attempt, it is still an 
indirect approach to address the issue of risk and risk preferences of managers. 
 It seems that the three-stage DEA can 
isolate environmental effects and statistical noise, but it also involves  tremendous 
calculations. Besides, it might also cause some other statistical problems by mixing 
parametric and nonparametric methods.  
Based on the demand system equations (3), (4), and (6), we first obtain expected return and 
risk and then estimate bank risk-return efficiency using stochastic frontier analysis, 
accounting for environmental factors. In doing so, the estimation can avoid some of the 
issues listed above. The expected return on equity (ER) is measured as:  
                                                 
10  Restricting the study sample still does not account for environmental differences between countries. Treating 
environmental factors as inputs or outputs requires a priori knowledge of environmental influences, but it is 
often the case that we can not determine their effects. 
11  In the first stage, the basic DEA is applied to bank data to yield initial efficiency scores and slacks. In the 
second stage, SFA is adopted to regress estimated slacks against environmental variables and in this way, one 
can isolate managerial inefficiency from both environmental effects and statistical noise. Some studies use the 
tobit regression in the second stage but this can only isolate environmental effects. The last stage adjusts 
inputs or outputs with the three-part decomposed slacks obtained in the previous stage and conduct DEA to the 
adjusted dataset. The details of three-stage DEA can be found in Fried, Lovell, Schmidt, and Yaisawarng 
(2002). ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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(7)      ˆ ( )/ ( ) [( )/ ] ER E p k s m k ππ π = = ⋅ ⋅+ βpy , 
where  ˆ () sπ β is the forecast profit share and ˆ β  denotes the vector of estimated parameters in 
equation (4). Risk (RK) is measured by the degree of uncertainties in predicting return on 
equity, which is the standard error of return on equity. It is measured as:  
(8)     








X  and  ˆˆ ˆ var( ) ' XβX  denotes the asymptotic variance of the fitted profit 
share,  () sπ β .  
When a manager chooses an ex ante riskier production plan or loan profile, the manager has 
less confidence in predicting profit compared to an ex ante lower risk production plan. Thus, 
this measure can indicate the risk inherent in the bank’s production plan: The higher 
standard error of ER suggests larger risk in the production plan. This risk measure depends 
on, among others, bank size, asset composition, average return on assets, costs of financial 
and nonfinancial inputs, the marginal tax rate on profits, the risk premium. It can, therefore, 
comprehensively indicate the risk inherent in the production plan. 
 Having  computed expected returns and risks, we then estimate the following risk-return 
frontier 
(9)     
2
01 2 it it it it it it ER RK RK v u =Γ +Γ +Γ + + − Ζζ , 
where    
2 ~ (0, ) it u v IIDN σ , 
      
2 0~ (0, ) it u u IIDN σ
+ ≥ .  
The composite error term contains inefficiency term (u) and statistical noise (v). Z is a vector 
of environmental factors, for instance, banking sector structure, bank regulations and 
macroeconomic fluctuations. These factors not only indirectly influence the expected profit 
through manager’s decisions over production plans but also directly affect the expected profit 
due to systematic differences or heterogeneity across banks. A bank’s inefficiency is 
measured by the conditional expectation of u  on   () vu ε = − , 










  =−  
  Φ−

, ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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where 
2 () u uv λ σ σσ =  and 
22
uv σ σσ = + . 
As for financial distress, its economic meaning is different from the bankruptcy, as 
emphasized in the literature (e.g., Dietrich, 1984). Financial distress can be equivalent to the 
economic insolvency (the loss exceeds the equity capital), while the bankruptcy is a legal 
term rather than an economic term. Econometric models—either probit/logit model or 
quadratic discriminant analysis—using bankruptcy data could under-predict or over-predict 
financial distress. Some firms may choose bankruptcy voluntarily while their economic 
conditions are not yet insolvent in the case of strategic bankruptcy. Estimation on the sample 
including these cases may over-predict financial distress. On the contrary, some firms are 
economically insolvent but they are not bankrupt due to financial support from the third 
parties (e.g. shareholders, industry group, and governmental institutions). In this case, 
econometric models may under-predict financial distress. To avoid these problems, we 
simply use estimated returns and risks from the system equations above to construct the 
indicator of financial distress probability (FD): 









The drawback of this measure, however, is that it only indicates the upper bound financial 
distress risk while the actual one could be different. However, given the data limitation, this 
may be the best approximation indicator to address the economic insolvency risk of banks. 
3.2.3  Bank Risk-Return Efficiency, Financial Distress and Bank Ratings 
Given the nature of the ranking data, the ordered response model would be proper to link 
risk-return efficiency and financial distress to bank ratings. Let BR represent the rating score 
assigned by Moody’s or by Fitch. The ordered logit model can be shown as follows, 
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where the error term in the latent model ( it e ) is assumed to follow the logistic distribution. 
* BR  is a continuous and unobserved latent variable, which can be interpreted as the 
hypothetical financial strength. The ordinal variable,BR, is coded on the n+1-point scale from 
0 to n, where 0 represents the poorest condition and n superior financial strength. X  is a ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
12 
vector of independent variables, including frontier expected return, risk level, efficiency, 
financial distress risk and bank size, in addition to year and region dummies.  
4.  DATA  
The sample used in this paper consists of 1,094 banks from the BankScope database that 
obtained ratings from either Moody’s or Fitch during the period 2000–2004. The three-year 
average value is used for financial and economic variables in estimations.
12 MBFSR and 
FBIR are mapped into eight numerical scores, with zero denoting the lowest rating, E, and 
eight representing the highest rating, A.
13
                                                 
12  The usage of three-year average values in the study is consistent with the rating methods of both rating 
agencies as they mainly use three-year financial data to issue ratings. 
 Note that Moody’s appends ‘+’ and ‘-’ to each 
category (from E up to A) to distinguish intermediate categories while Fitch only uses the 
slash to express intermediate categories. To make the rating system comparable, we 
rescaled Moody’s intermediate categories according to Fitch’s methodology. As shown in 
Table 1, banks rated by Fitch generally obtained higher ratings, compared to those rated by 
Moody’s. In the Fitch rated sample, 3.2% were assigned A, while only 0.8% of Moody’s rating 
sample were rated A.  
13  If MBFSR and FBIR are updated in a year, the latest ratings are used. ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Table 1: Transformation of Letter to Numeric Variable for Ratings 
Moody’s  Fitch 
Interpretation
b  Mapping 
Rating  Frequency
a  Rating  Frequency
a 
A  26 (0.79%)  A  101 (3.2%) 
Superior intrinsic financial strength: highly 
valuable and defensible business 
franchises, outstanding financial 
fundamentals, and a very predictable and 
stable operating environment. 
8 
A-,B+  161 (4.9%)  A/B  304 (9.62%) 
   
7 
B  328 
(9.99%)  B  895 (28.32%) 
Strong intrinsic financial strength: valuable 
and defensible business franchises, good 
financial fundamentals, a predictable and 
stable operating environment, and no 
major concerns. 
6 
B-,C+  590 
(17.97%)  B/C  685 (21.68%) 
   
5 
C  472 
(14.38%)  C  425 (13.45%) 
Adequate intrinsic financial strength: 
limited but still valuable business 
franchises, possessing one or more 
problems with financial fundamentals or 
the operating environment. 
4 
C-,D+  705 
(21.47%)  C/D  280 (8.86%) 
   
3 
D  349 
(10.63%)  D  299 (9.46%) 
Modest intrinsic financial strength 
(potentially requiring some outside 
supports): a weak business franchise, 
deficient financial fundamentals in one or 
more respects, or an unpredictable and 
unstable operating environment. 
2 
D-,E+  480 
(14.62%)  D/E  127 (4.02%) 
   
1 
E  172 
(5.24%)  E  44 (1.39%) 
Very modest intrinsic financial strength 
(very serious problems, either requiring or 
being likely to require external supports): a 
weak and limited business franchise, 
materially deficient financial fundamentals 
in one or more respects, or a highly 




a The frequency is calculated based on 3,283 observations for Moody’s and 3,160 observations for Fitch. 
b The Interpretations of ratings are from websites of Moody’s and Fitch. 
Source: Authors and Moody’s and Fitch databases. ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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In this paper, we primarily follow  the intermediate approach to define bank outputs and 
inputs. Outputs comprise interbank loans ( 1 y ), customer loans ( 2 y ), securities investments 
( 3 y ), and off-balance sheet activities ( 4 y ). Off-balance sheet items, mainly consisting of non-
traditional activities (e.g. loan commitments, securitizations, and derivatives), are considered 
as an output of banks since omitting them in the estimation of bank efficiency could result in 
a misspecification of bank output and lead to incorrect conclusions.
14
p 
 The average price or 
yield of outputs ( ) is defined as the ratio of operating income (the sum of interest income, 
securities investment and trading income, and fees) to total outputs. Bank inputs are physical 
assets ( 1 x ), employees ( 2 x ), and borrowed financial funds ( 3 x ), and their prices are  1 w  
(depreciation and other operating expenses over fixed assets),  2 w  (personnel expenses per 
employee), and  3 w  (total interest expenses over total borrowed financial funds), respectively. 
The price of after-tax profit ( pπ ) is defined as 1/(1 ) t − , where the mean marginal tax rate on 
pre-tax profit (t) is measured by running a simple regression of taxes paid by banks on pre-
tax profits for each country and each year.  
The nonoperating income (m ) is adjusted to take into account the standard error of the 
measured tax rate. The share of each input ( i SW ) is calculated as the ratio of each input’s 
expenses to total revenue ( py m +  ). The sum of shares for inputs and profit is 100%. Table 2 
presents the summary statistics of bank production variables from 2000 to 2004.  
                                                 
14 For more detailed discussions on this topic, please refer to studies such as, among others, Rogers (1998), 
Stiroh (2000), Clark and Siems (2002).  ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Bank Production Variables (2000–2004) 
Variable 
  Description  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
1 y
 
1)  Inter-bank loans  25600.00  56100.00  6.40  517000.00 
2 y
 
1)  Customer loans  5894.98  19400.00  0.03  299000.00 
3 y
 
1)  Securities   13300.00  39100.00  0.0001  578000.00 
 
  Investments         
4 y
 
1)  Off-balance sheet 
items 
23300.00  245000.00  0.025  9120000.00 
p 
 
2)  Avg. price of outputs  8.12  5.04  0.03  61.08 
1 x
 
1)  Physical assets  571.29  1344.07  0.10  16600.00 
2 x
 
3)  Employees  12192.96  29348.24  10  323937 
3 x
 
1)  Borrowed funds  42300.00  96400.00  26.01  893000.00 
1 w
 
2)  Price of physical 
assets 
348.05  2704.27  0.15  87985.05 
2 w
 
1)  Wage rate  0.077  0.74  0.0001  25.41 
3 w
 
2)  Price of borrowed 
funds 
4.36  3.13  0.05  34.22 
π  
1)  Profit after-tax  381.06  1042.23  -2229.59  16900.00 
pπ  
2)  Price of after-tax profit  1.37  0.19  0.38  3.14 
t  
2)  Mean tax rate  25.20  11.99  -162.85  68.18 
py m + 
 
1)  Total revenue  3319.29  7619.38  5.08  98800.00 
1 SW  
2)  Input share of 
Physical assets 
0.19  0.10  0.001  0.78 
2 SW  
2)  Input share of labor  0.18  0.08  0.001  0.52 
3 SW  
2)  Input share of 
borrowed funds 
0.47  0.20  0.001  1.69 
SWπ  
2)  Share of pre-tax profit  0.17  0.15  -1.46  0.82 
k  
1)  Equity capital  4545.94  11800.00  3.40  195000.00 
A  
1)  Total assets  50800.00   121000.00   32.59  1280000.00  
r  
2)  Risk-free rate  5.35  7.52  0.05  68.57 
Notes: N=3366; 
1) in millions of US dollar; 
2) in percentage; 
3) the number of people. Std. Dev means standard 
deviation. 
Source: Authors. ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
16 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
5.1  The AID System Estimation and Robustness of Estimates of 
Risks 
The nonlinear SURE model is applied to estimate the nonlinear AID system during 2000–
2004.
15
To check the robustness of estimated risks, we also conducted a robustness test by 
regressing some traditional risk proxies on risk measures obtained from the AID system, i.e. 
RK and FD. As the main financial risk for banks is credit risk, the robustness test selects 
several financial ratios to indicate credit risk. These financial ratios include loan-asset ratio, 
NPL ratio, the standard deviation of NPL over three years and the ratio of loan-loss provision 
to total assets. The loan-asset ratio attempts to capture the total exposure of a bank to credit 
risk, while the NPL ratio shows the past credit risk and the loan-loss provision implies the 
managers’ view on future credit risk. The standard deviation of NPL over three years 
indicates the fluctuation of credit risk. The banking literature suggests that the higher these 
ratios, the riskier a bank would be. The liquidity risk is indicated by the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets. Holding other factors constant, the higher the liquidity ratio, the less probability a 
bank would run into liquidity shortage. The deposit mix represents the diversification of a 
bank’s deposit-taking. The operating risk is mainly indicated by three ratios, including gross 
operating income and the ratios of operating and other operating expenses to total assets. 
Higher income or lower expenses can indicate that a bank can manage its operating risk 
well. The equity-asset ratio is included to examine overall insolvency risk. Many studies have 
suggested that the less equity a bank holds, the more moral hazard a bank may have. In 
addition, facing financial shocks, well-capitalized banks would have more funds to buffer their 
losses, compared to weakly-capitalized banks. Thus, banks with high equity-asset ratio tend 
to have less risk, holding other factors constant.  
 It is worth noting that homoskedasticity on the error terms is not imposed so that the 
risk of the production plan can be measured. Therefore, the statistical significance is not 
shown in the table.  
The fixed effects estimations of these two regressions are shown in Table 3. The estimations 
show that traditional risk proxies are, in general, statistically significant with correct signs in 
both regressions. However, the overall R-square is not high in either model. It seems that the 
two risk measures obtained from the AID system do capture the major bank risks indicated 
by these financial ratios, while the low R-square might suggest that these risk measures may 
contain much richer information than these financial ratios. 
 
                                                 
15  The coefficients of the nonlinear AID system can be obtained from the authors upon request.  ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Coeff.  Coeff.  Mean 
(std. err.)  (std. err.)  (Std. Dev.) 
(1) Total loans / total assets  0.005
**  0.001  56.146 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (18.234) 
(2) Nonperforming loans / total assets  0.014
***  0.013
***  4.917 
(0.005)  (0.003)  (6.901) 
(3) Standard deviation of NPL ratio in 3 years  -0.002  0.001  1.171 
(0.006)  (0.003)  (2.467) 
(4) Loan-loss provision / total assets  -0.013  0.028
***  0.673 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (1.33) 
(5) Liquid assets / total assets  -0.004
*  -0.001
***  18.018 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (15.387) 
(6) Deposit mix  -0.902
***  -0.303
***  0.555 
(0.195)  (0.102)  (0.267) 
(7) Gross operating income  -0.937
***  -0.468
***  14.987 
(0.133)  (0.069)  (0.494) 
(8) Operating expenses / total assets  0.039
***  0.013
***  3.693 
(0.009)  (0.005)  (3.457) 
(9) Other operating expenses / total assets  0.003
**  0.003
***  29.538 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (31.598) 
(10) Equity / total assets  -0.054
***  -0.029
***  8.641 
(0.007)  (0.003)  (6.94) 
(11) Size  -0.348
***  -0.122
***  16.174 
(0.046)  (0.024)  (1.755) 
Note: Fixed effects estimates are presented in the table. Coeff. means coefficient; std.err. means standard error; and 
Std. Dev. Means standard deviation. 
*, **, *** denote the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Authors. 
5.2  Bank Risk-Return Frontier and Efficiency 
We applied the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to the pooled cross-sectional sample. To 
examine the robustness of the risk-return frontier, two specifications were estimated. The first 
specification includes the estimated risk and its square, in addition to year dummies, while 
the second specification also contains environmental factors (GDP growth rate, domestic ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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credit to private sector over GDP, and banking sector structural variables and regulatory 
factors).
16
GDP growth rate (gGDP) and domestic credit expansion (gCredit) indicates the economic 
and credit cyclical fluctuations, respectively. Herfindahl index (BHI) indicates the competition 
degree in one banking sector, while government ownership (BSOBR) and foreign ownership 
(BFOBR) indicate ownership structure in the banking sector.
  
17 A binary variable (BDepress) 
is included to indicate whether a banking sector experiences serious depression or crisis.
18 
Entry restriction (EntryREG), activity restriction (ActREG), and capital adequacy regulation 
(CAPREG), and disclosure requirements (PMI) vary across countries, indicating different 
regulatory environment.
19  Supervisory power (SuperPower) and Supervisory agency 
independence (SuperIndep) are included to indicate how strong the supervisory authority can 
correct bank activities.
20 The deposit insurance scheme (DIS, MHI, and DISPower) is also 
included.
21
                                                 
16  The environmental variables included in risk-return frontier estimation are mainly obtained from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund, Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005), 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), and regulatory surveys conducted by Barth, Caprio and Levine in the World 
Bank. 
 
17  Herfindahl index here is calculated using bank assets data, namely, BHI=the sum of the square of each bank 
asset as percentage of banking sector total assets, with smaller values indicating that a banking sector is less 
concentrated and more competitive. BSOBR and BFOBR are measured by their shares in the banking sector 
assets. These variables are aggregated using the data from BankScope.  
18  Banking depression dummy variable takes one if there is a serious banking depression and zero otherwise, 
and it is defined in greater detail in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). 
19  The entry restriction (EntryREG) ranges in value from 0 to 8, with higher values representing more 
restrictiveness. Bank activity restrictions (ActREG) are regulations on the ability of banks to engage in 
securities underwriting, brokering and dealing, insurance underwriting and selling, as well as real estate 
investment, development and management. This variable ranges in  value from 1 to 4, with higher values 
indicating greater restrictiveness. Capital stringency regulation (CAPREG) refers to regulations on minimum 
capital ratios, definitions of capital, risk-based guidance, among others. This variable ranges in value from 0 to 
7, with higher values indicating greater stringency. Disclosure requirements (PMI) specify the auditor, non-
performing loans disclosure, off-balance-sheet items disclosure, among others. It ranges in value from 0 to 7 as 
well. These variables are obtained from the surveys conducted by Barth, Capiro, and Levine.  
20  Supervisory power (SuperPower) takes values 0 to 16, the sum of 16 binary indicators. Supervisory agency 
independence (SuperIndep) takes values 1, 2, and 3, with higher values indicating higher dependence degree 
of the supervisory agency. These variables are obtained from the surveys conducted by Barth, Capiro and 
Levine. 
21  Deposit insurance (DIS) takes value 0 to 2 indicating how well the deposit is protected. Deposit insurance 
scheme design (MHI) is to indicate the moral hazard caused by the scheme. It is the first principal component 
of nine factors (e.g., insurance coverage, management, premium, fund, source of fund, etc.), and it explains 
around 84.5% of the total variation in these nine variables. Deposit insurance agency’s power (DISPower) ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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As shown in Table 4, the coefficients of RK and RK
2 are consistently significant and are 
similar in terms of size in both specifications. The positive slope of estimated risk suggests 
that banks are not pure profit maximizers, but rather are trading returns for reduced risks. 
This result is consistent with those in DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon (2001), Koetter (2004, 
2006),  among others. Furthermore, SFA results also suggest that domestic financial 
deepening, market competition, and the authorities’ power (including regulatory authorities 
and deposit insurers) to make prompt corrective action on banks would shift the risk-return 
frontier outward while entry restrictions, capital regulation, bank disclosure requirements, and 
banking sector depression would shift the frontier inward. Having accounted for market 
competition effects, it seems that foreign bank participation does not really move the risk-
return frontier outward. The risk-return frontier for sampled banks is shown in Figure 2, which 
has taken into account of environmental factors.  
                                                                                                                                                    
reflects whether the agency has the authority to intervene banks, whether the agency can take legal actions 
against banks, and whether the legal actions have been taken. This variable takes values from 1 to 4, with 
higher values indicating stronger power. These values are obtained from Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, and 
Laeven (2005). ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Table 4: Risk-return Stochastic Frontier Analysis Results (2000-2004) 
Dependent variable: Expected Return 
   
(1) Risk-Return Frontier without 
Environmental Factors     
(2) Risk-Return Frontier 
with Environmental 
Factors 
Coeff.  (Std.Err)      Coeff.  (Std.Err.) 
Constant  0.266
***  (0.007)    0.443
***  (0.044) 
Risk  0.996
***  (0.004)    0.991
***  (0.004) 
Risk-square  -0.011
***  (0.000)    -0.011
***  (0.000) 
gGDP        -0.001  (0.001) 
Credit to private sector/GDP      0.0001
***  (0.000) 
BHI        -0.102
**  (0.049) 
BSOBR        0  (0.000) 
BFOBR        -0.0002
**  (0.000) 
BDEPRESS        -0.036
***  (0.009) 
EntryREG        -0.008
**  (0.004) 
ActREG        0.005  (0.006) 
CapREG        -0.006
**  (0.002) 
SuperPower        0.004
***  (0.001) 
SuperIndep        -0.002  (0.005) 
PMI        -0.018
***  (0.004) 
DIS        -0.057
***  (0.008) 
DISPOWER        0.011
***  (0.004) 
MHI        0.002  (0.002) 
Y00  0.061
***  (0.009)    0.055
***  (0.010) 
Y01  -0.212
***  (0.008)    -0.221
***  (0.009) 
Y02  0.002  (0.009)    0  (0.009) 





***  (0.063)    2.233
***  (0.066) 
  0.222
***  (0.001)    0.211
***  (0.001) 
LogL  1,687.56    1,851.42 
N  3,366      3,366 
Source: Authors. 
2 () u uv λ σ σσ =
22
uv σ σσ = +ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Figure 2: The Best-practice Stochastic Risk-return Frontier ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics on Estimates of Risk-return Profile 
Variable 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Total 
N=570  N=628  N=678  N=729  N=761  N=3,366 
Expected Return  1.22  0.02  0.39  0.34  0.32  0.43 
(1.27)  (0.14)  (0.3)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.69) 
Risk  1.1  0.16  0.27  0.22  0.2  0.36 
(1.79)  (0.18)  (0.35)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.85) 
Efficiency  0.86  0.85  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.86 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.08) 
Financial Distress Risk 
0.43  0.17  0.17  0.14  0.13  0.2 
(0.14)  (0.32)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.21) 
Note: Standard deviation is provided in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors.  
Figure 3: Bank Ratings in the Risk-return Profile (2000–2004) ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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The ordered logit estimates for both Moody’s and Fitch are presented in Table 6. The 
explanatory variables include the estimated frontier expected return (corresponding to point 
E in Figure 1), the estimated risk, the estimated  upper bound financial distress  risk,  the 
estimated risk-return efficiency, size (logarithm of total assets), and dummies for time (Y00-
Y03)  and market maturity  (OECD). The sign and significance level of most independent 
variables (e.g. the frontier expected return, the estimated risk, efficiency, size, and dummy 
variables for mature markets) are the same for both ratings. This shows that both rating 
agencies assign higher ratings to banks with higher risk-return efficiency and encourage 
banks to trade expected returns for reduced risks. In other words, both rating models are 
consistent with the estimated risk-return efficiency ranks. However, one noticeable difference 
between these two bank rating models is the significance level of the upper bound financial 
distress risk. After controlling for other factors, Moody’s attaches no importance on the upper 
bound financial distress risk while Fitch does in the rating process. That is, while both rating 
agencies encourage banks to trade expected returns for reduced risks, Fitch probably 
encourages banks to take less risks than Moody’s does.  ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Table 6: Ordered Logit Model Regressions (Random Effects Estimates, 2000–2004) 
    MBFSR      FBIR 
    Coeff.  (Std.Err.)      Coeff.  (Std.Err.) 
Constant  -15.792
***  (0.835)    -12.414
***  (0.854) 
Frontier Expected Return  2.794
***  (0.912)    7.463
***  (0.869) 
Risk  -3.536
***  (0.878)    -8.399
***  (0.846) 
Financial Distress Risk  -0.224  (0.244)    -0.436
*  (0.26) 
Efficiency  5.318
***  (0.69)    7.477
***  (0.739) 
Size  0.896
***  (0.028)    0.553
***  (0.024) 
OECD  2.330
***  (0.101)    2.327
***  (0.108) 
Y00  0.709
***  (0.168)    0.914
***  (0.171) 
Y01  1.042
***  (0.234)    1.933
***  (0.222) 
Y02  0.195
*  (0.116)    0.094  (0.113) 
Y03  0.103  (0.113)    0.012  (0.111) 
Log-L  -3,414.94    -3,754.70 
N  2,237      2,429 
Notes: *, **, *** denote the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Authors. 
Table 7 presents the marginal effects of several estimated factors (the frontier expected 
return, the estimated risk, the upper bound financial distress risk, and risk-return efficiency) 
on the probability of each rating score. Again, it seems that these factors have very similar 
marginal effects on each rating score of both ratings. Careful examination, however, may 
show a small difference in the marginal effects of the upper bound financial distress risk on 
low rating scores. As seen in the table, financial distress risk shows no significance in 
affecting Moody’s lowest two rating scores while it significantly affects the lowest two rating 
scores of Fitch’s. This may imply that Fitch pays extra attention to the risk-taking behavior of 
those banks with low financial strength.  ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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Table 7: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Each Grade (2000–2004) 
  Frontier Expected Return  Risk  Financial Distress 
Risk 
Efficiency 
MBFSR         
E  -0.007
***  0.009




***  0.006  -0.140
*** 
D  -0.122  0.154  0.01  -0.231 
D+,C-  -0.435
*  0.551  0.035  -0.829 
C  -0.013  0.016  0.001  -0.024 









B+,A-  0.05  -0.063  -0.004  0.094 
A  0.006
**  -0.007
**  -0.001  0.011
** 











D  -0.271  0.305  0.016  -0.271 
D/C  -0.439  0.494  0.026  -0.44 
C  -0.793  0.892  0.046  -0.794 






B/A  0.39  -0.439  -0.023  0.391 
A  0.113
***  -0.128
***  -0.007  0.114
*** 
Notes: *, **, *** denote the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Authors. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This  study empirically investigated the consistency between bank ratings and risk-return 
profile. We applied an AID system to measure the bank risk-return efficiency and the upper 
bound financial distress risk. Applying the ordered logit method, we found that both the 
Moody’s and the Fitch generally assign higher ratings to banks with higher risk-return 
efficiency and encourage them to trade expected returns for reduced risks. Thus, it seems 
that both rating models do take the risk-return profiles of banks into consideration. However, 
the difference between these two rating agencies is that they seem to attach different 
importance of the banks’ distress risk in their rating assignments. It seems that Fitch is more 
risk averse since it pays extra attention to banks’ financial distress risk, thus assigning higher 
ratings to those banks with the characteristics of low risks and low returns. This might be the 
reason why we tend to observe that the Fitch assigns higher ratings to banks than does 
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APPENDIX I: THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FOR THE 
BANK 
In the banking industry, debt leverage is usually large, and therefore, risk management is 
important for banks so as to avoid financial risk and financial fragility. Because of the serious 
consequence of financial fragility, bank managers may trade expected returns for reduced 
risks in their production plan so that they can preserve the bank. This results in financial 
stability as well as maintaining bank managers’ jobs. Thus, ignoring bank risks and 
managers’ risk preference in the efficiency analysis may give a wrong evaluation of bank 
performance and probably undervalues managers’ efforts to maintaining financial stability.  
In general, if bank managers maximize expected profits, they rank production plans only by 
the first moment of the expected profit distribution. However, if they maximize a managerial 
utility function, higher moments of the expected profit distribution will matter in the ranking 
(Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 1999). More importantly, the standard approach of 
maximizing expected profits or minimizing expected costs is a special case of the new 
approach of maximizing a generalized managerial utility function when managers are risk-
neutral.
22 If bank managers trade profit for other objectives (e.g. reduced risks), then their 
utility function will include other arguments (such as risk) in addition to profit. However, it is 
difficult to measure all types of risk and include them in the function. Hughes, Lang, Mester, 
and Moon (1995) defined the generalized managerial utility function over production plans, 
input mix, and profits conditional on endogenous prices. Such definition enables managers 
to rank production plans and profit according to their risk preferences and their expectations 
about the probability distribution of profit. The merit of this framework is that the derived cost 
and profit functions allow for higher moments of the conditional distribution of profits and, 
therefore, allow for non-neutral risk preference of managers.
23
Banks are assumed to produce a portfolio of loans and securities with labor, physical capital, 
and financial funds (deposits, equity capital, and other borrowed funds) given production 
technology and environmental constraints. The portfolio production plan is designated by 
 
(,,) k yx . The transformation function,  (,,) 0 Tk ≤ yx , defines the feasible set of portfolio 
production plans, given production technology and environmental constraints. As shown in 
Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995), the generalized managerial utility function is 
defined as (,,,,,) U rk π yxp .
24
Managers choose their most preferred production plan or their most preferred subjective 
conditional probability distribution of profit, and hence, managers maximize the generalized 
 Note that the managerial utility function is defined differently 
from the individual utility function which is usually defined over consumption and leisure. The 
managerial utility function is defined to capture the risk preferences of a group of bank 
managers and shows how satisfied these managers in a bank is in organizing the resources 
of the bank and selecting certain profit targets, subject to the production constraint that the 
input mix must produce the given output vector. The input mix is also included in the 
managerial utility function mainly because in organizing the production plan, risk-averse 
bank managers may fund their loans from more costly but less volatile sources, such as core 
deposits. In other words, the risk characteristics of the input mix should also be taken into 
account when managers are not risk neutral (Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 1995). 
                                                 
22  Indeed, the utility maximization approach has been widely employed in the literature on modeling bank’s 
behavior (Santomero 1984). 
23  Non-neutral risk preference could be risk-loving or risk-averse.  
24  In Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995) and their companion studies, NPLs are also used to indicate the 
output quality, but it is dropped here. The reason is twofold: first, as expressed in Hughes, Lang, Mester, and 
Moon (1995), this variable only indicates ex post the output quality and can not show the exact quality of assets 
that are being held by banks; second, the data for this variable are generally either unavailable or not 
comparable, especially in the context of international comparison of banking efficiency. ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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utility function with respect to profit and input, subject to the profit identity and the 
transformation functions. The utility-maximizing problem (UMP) can be shown as follows: 















where w is a vector of input prices. Note that the UMP is conditioned on the output vector, 
y, to facilitate the computation of economies of scale and on equity capital, k , to allow the 
profit demand function to be normalized by equity capital to obtain the rate of return on 
equity (Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 2000).
25
The dual problem of the UMP is the expenditure minimization problem (EMP) which tries to 
minimize the managerial expenditure on profits and inputs for a specific level of utility (
 The solution to this utility maximization 
problem gives the managers’ most preferred production plan. 
0 U ) 
at given prices, output quantities, output quality, and financial capital.  




. . (,,,,,) 0
(,,) 0
p











Note that the EMP is not intended to minimize profit; instead, it attempts to minimize the 
managerial expenditure for after-tax profit. The difference between  π π p  and π  is the tax on 
profit. Thus, the EMP for  π π p  mainly means that, given the tax rate on profit (i.e., given the 
price of after-tax profit), bank managers choose certain target of after-tax profit to minimize 
their efforts (the managerial expenditure) on obtaining the target. In this sense,  π π p  also 
reflects managerial expenditure to obtain such level’s profit.  
Solving UMP yields the manager’s most preferred production plan, 
*(,, ,) mk x yv , and the 
managers’ most preferred profit function, 
*(,, ,) mk π yv , where  ( ,,, ) rp π = v wp  denotes the 
price and tax environment of a bank. As it reflects bank managers’ risk-preference, the 
resulting profit function does not necessarily achieve the maximum profits since profits may 
be used to trade for less risk. Furthermore, as it is conditional on the risk-preference, the 
most preferred profit demand function can be used to estimate the risk-return frontier. The 
solution of EMP gives Hickian or constant-utility demand functions, 
0 (,,, )
u kU x yv , 
0 (,,, )
u kU π yv , and the minimum expenditure function, 
0 (,,, ) E kU yv . Inverting the 
expenditure function, one can obtain the indirect utility function,  (,, ,) V mk yv . Substituting 
0 U  with V , one can obtain the following three equations: 
* (,,, (,, ,) ) (,, ,)
u kV mk mk = x yv yv x yv , 
* (,,, (,, ,) ) (,, ,)
u kV mk mk ππ = yv yv yv , 
(,,,(,, ,) ) E kV mk m =⋅+ yv yv py . 
 
                                                 
25  Profit demand function mainly describes managers’ demand for profit or mangers’ profit target.  ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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APPENDIX II: RESTRICTIONS OF PARAMETERS IN THE 
AID SYSTEM 
The partial differentiation of the expenditure function  gives the following symmetry 
conditions: 
(S1)     , ij ji ij δδ = ∀  , 
(S2)     ss s ππ ωω = ∀  , and 
(S3)     , si is si ωω = ∀  . 
The first symmetry condition needs to be held since the constituent coefficients can not be 
identified separately, while it is not necessary to hold the last two.  
 
The expenditure function is homogenous of degree one, and therefore, inputs and profit 
share equations are homogeneous of degree zero in ( , ,, wprp π  ), which yields the following 
homogeneity conditions: 
(H1)  0 j v µ += ∑ , 
(H2)  1 pj π α ωητ + + += ∑ , 
(H3)  0 pp t pt pr pπ α φψψ + ++= ∑ , 
(H4)  0   pt s st tr t t π φ ωωω + ++= ∀ ∑ , 
(H5)  0  rr pr s sr r π τψ ωη ++ += ∑ , 
(H6)  0   pj t jt j jr j π θ γγγ + ++= ∀ ∑ , 
(H7)  0  p ss r ππ π π π ηψ ωη + + += ∑ , 





pp s t st t pt rr p pr s sr s s r ππ π π π α ω φ τ ηψ ψ ω ωη + + + + + ++ + += ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
 
The sum of input and profit shares equal one, requiring the following adding-up conditions: 
(A1)  1 ii π ωη += ∑ , 
(A2)  0   i si s s π ωω += ∀ ∑ , 
(A3)  0  i pi pπ φψ += ∑ , 
(A4)  0   i ji j j π γγ += ∀ ∑ , 
(A5)  0  ii π ππ ωη += ∑ , 
(A6)  0  i ir r π ωη += ∑ , ADBI Working Paper 240                Hua and Liu 
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(A7)  0  i ik k π ωη += ∑ , and  
(A8)  0 j v µ += ∑ . 